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[139] 
The Ethics of Governance 
 
Justice Gordon Goodman* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this Article, I discuss the need for a board of last resort to set financial 
values during periods of extreme economic stress, i.e., the “liquidity black 
hole” events discussed below. The purpose of this proposed board, the 
“Independent Treasury Board,” would be to address valuation uncertainty 
during bust periods immediately following major financial crises. 
If an Independent Treasury Board existed prior to 2008, it could have 
helped rein in some valuations that were among the causes for the Great 
Recession.1 More importantly, it could have quickened recovery from the 
Great Recession during the period immediately following the financial crisis 
by shortening the period of valuation uncertainty. If created now, the 
Independent Treasury Board should become a permanent part of the United 
States Treasury Department. 
 
II. LIQUIDITY BLACK HOLE EVENTS 
 
There are many ways to describe liquidity black hole events, below is 
one example: 
 
Occasionally, financial markets experience episodes of 
turbulence of such an extreme kind that it appears to stop 
functioning. Such episodes are marked by a heavily one-sided 
 
        *   Justice Gordon Goodman serves as a Justice of the Court of Appeals for the First District of 
Texas.  Before joining the bench in 2019, he served in senior positions for the Howell Corporation; E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co.; Conoco, Inc.; and Occidental Petroleum Corporation. He has worked on 
advisory committees for the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the American Petroleum Institute, 
and the Energy Oversight Committee. In connection with his advisory work, he has published many 
articles on finance, contracts, risk analysis, ethics, and governance. He earned his BA degree magna cum 
laude from the University of Pennsylvania and his JD degree from the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School both in Philadelphia. He received his high school diploma from the Horace Mann School in the 
Bronx, NY. 
 1. See Robert C. Pozen, Is It Fair to Blame Fair Value Accounting for the Financial Crisis, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Nov. 2009); John Weinberg, The Great Recession and its Aftermath, FEDERAL RES. HIST. 
(Nov. 22, 2013). 
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order flow, rapid price changes and financial distress on the part 
of many of the traders. The 1987 stock market crash is perhaps the 
most glaring example . . . Practitioners dub such episodes as . . . 
“liquidity black holes.”2 
 
Though other financial risks, such as price and credit risk, may be better 
known to the public, liquidity risk presents the most profound systemic risk 
to our financial systems. A simple way of thinking about liquidity is to 
compare it with the physical concept of buoyancy. Buyers in the marketplace 
exert upward pressure on financial instruments, while sellers provide 
downward pressure. When buyers exit a market due to overvaluations 
towards the end of a boom period, even the smallest downward pressure from 
sellers can drive values below normal levels, thus creating a “bust.” 
 
III. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE GREAT RECESSION 
 
In an earlier article that I wrote on liquidity risk,3 I noted that the 
collateral, or liquidity, provisions contained in almost every over-the-counter 
financial industry contract (including swaps, options, and derivatives of all 
kinds) have hard collateral triggers that can cause unintended consequences 
during periods of extreme financial stress. All such unregulated contracts 
require one of the parties to set the “fair value” for these financial 
instruments, a process that becomes difficult when markets dry up since most 
valuations rely upon recent, arms-length, comparable transactions. 
I have also previously written about techniques that may be available to 
predict future financial collapse events.4 In July 2007, I published an article 
in which I noted that a form of measurable credit risk had fallen to “zero” 
probability, and since it could not fall any further, credit risk would 
inevitably have to be corrected by going back up.5 Though I was accurate in 
making this particular prediction, the ability to forecast financial crises 
accurately is limited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 2. Stephen Edward Morris & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity Black Holes, COWLES FOUND. FOR RES. 
IN ECONOMICS, YALE UNIV., Discussion Paper No. 1434 (Sept. 2003). 
 3. Gordon E. Goodman, Liquidity Risk Management: Where the Bucks Stop, GARP RISK REVIEW, 
Nov./Dec. 2005, at 11. 
 4. Gordon E. Goodman, Credit Risk: Will the “Bubble” Burst?, GARP RISK REVIEW, July/Aug. 
2007. 
 5. Id. at 43. 
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IV. PROFESSOR TAUS AND THE  
INDEPENDENT TREASURY SYSTEM 
 
In talking about the risks that can arise from liquidity black hole 
events, I note that they are distinct from normal liquidity problems and 
seasonal fund flows. As an example of these seasonal flows, the late, 
distinguished Professor Esther Taus described the “annual autumnal 
stringencies” that arose throughout the 19th century and early 20th 
century, which were associated with funding requirements for agriculture 
in the southern and western regions of the United States.6 A detailed 
analysis of the pragmatic techniques adopted by the U.S. Treasury 
Department through its “Independent Treasury System” (a precursor to 
the Federal Reserve System) appears in Taus’s comprehensive study of 
the central banking functions in the United States.7 The Independent 
Treasury System existed from 1846 through 1920. 
A revived and repurposed Independent Treasury System, working 
with the Federal Reserve System, could serve as a bulwark against 
valuation confusion in the days immediately following a financial crisis. 
Valuations of last resort by an Independent Treasury Board, backed by a 
Sub-Treasury, could provide immediate stability and certainty before 
longer term liquidity programs (like the Federal Reserve’s recent 
“Quantitative Easing Program,” which covered only a small subset of 
financial instruments)8 can begin to repair long-term damage. 
Quantitative Easing is a form of unconventional monetary policy under 
which central banks purchase “. . . financial assets such as Treasuries or 
mortgage-backed securities in an attempt to reduce yield, boost lending, 
and stimulate economic activities.”9   
 
 
 
 
 
 6. ESTHER ROGOFF TAUS, CENTRAL BANKING FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TREASURY, 
1789-1941 104 (1967). In describing this process, Professor Taus notes: “[b]ut even a slight contraction 
in the amount of money available for reserve may have an important effect on the money market, 
especially if reserves are near the legal minimum. Contraction (though apparently insignificant in amount) 
may contribute to or even produce a money stringency. This in turn may result in a violent reaction in the 
general level of price, a disturbance in interbank settlements and disorder in almost every part of business 
activity.” Id. at 79. 
 7.  See id. at 85–133 (The Independent Treasury as the Real Central Bank, 1890-1912). 
 8. See INDRANEEL CHAKRABORTY, ITAY GOLDSTEIN & ANDREW MACKINLAY, MONETARY 
STIMULUS AND BANK LENDING (2019), available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~itayg/Files?qeb 
anklending-forthcoming.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2020). 
 9. Id. at 2. 
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V. EFFORTS TO PROVIDE VALUATION STABILITY IN 2008 
 
From 2007 to 2013, I served on the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board’s (“FASB’s”) Valuation Resource Group (the “VRG”), which was 
formed as problems in setting the value for certain financial instruments 
became apparent. Banks and other companies in the financial industry were 
finding it increasingly difficult to identify comparable values for mortgage-
backed securities and other exotic financial instruments that were being 
bundled and sold at that time.10 
Though banks had reverse engineered the process used by major rating 
agencies to obtain relatively high ratings for unconventional instruments 
versus other more traditional investments, the growing lack of appetite for 
these complex instruments, regardless of their ratings, made valuations 
problematic. At the VRG, among the many questions we received, was 
whether older and less reliable transactions could be used in setting the fair 
value for these instruments. 
When the crisis finally came to a head with the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy filing in September 2008, the members of the VRG discussed 
how best to bring stability back to financial markets. Several members 
suggested that a system for setting authoritative fair values (and not just 
advisory opinions), often in the absence of recent market transactions, could 
be important in restoring investor confidence to markets. This system could 
be critical for certain financial instruments that are: (1) subject to fair value 
measurement under generally accepted accounting principles (the 
“GAAP”);11 (2) subject to reporting requirements in standard financial 
reports for public corporations under SEC rules;12 but (3) are not valued 
through a regulated exchange. 
As a result of these discussions, on September 24, 2008, I along with 
another member of the VRG wrote the following letter to the Secretary of 
the Treasury Department, Mr. Henry M. Paulson, Jr.: 
 
The undersigned are members of the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board’s Valuation Resource Group, which is known as 
the ‘VRG.’ We are writing to you today however as individual 
 
 10. The structure of the VRG, an advisory board to FASB, composed of leading financial, 
accounting, and legal experts, is a possible model for a new Independent Treasury Board. 
 11. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(a), 78m(b)(1) (granting SEC authority to establish GAAP applicable 
to financial statements and other documents filed under Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934); SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,172 (Dec. 20, 
1973) (delegating authority to establish GAAP to Financial Accounting Standards Board). 
 12. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (requiring issuers of securities to file “annual reports” and 
“quarterly reports” as prescribed by SEC); 17 C.F.R. Part 230 (setting forth General Rules and 
Regulations applicable to annual and quarterly reports). 
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valuation experts and concerned citizens. A copy of this note is 
being sent to Mr. Robert Herz, the Chairman of FASB, with whom 
we have discussed the following proposal to assist Treasury. 
 
On a voluntary basis, we offer to assist Treasury in designing and 
implementing an orderly process for valuing certain financial 
instruments, which are to be acquired by Treasury under a bill now 
pending in Congress. We have had extensive hands-on experience 
in calculating the fair value of complex derivative instruments in 
addition to our policy work for the VRG. 
 
Please let us know if we can be of assistance to you and 
Treasury.13 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the urgency of the crisis, we did not hear 
back from the Treasury Department on our offer. As a result, on October 7, 
2008, we wrote a follow-up letter to the Secretary in which we offered to 
serve on a “Credit Review Committee” that was being discussed at that time. 
Though this Committee was authorized to be formed under the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,14 it never came into existence. 
 
VI. CREATION OF A NEW “INDEPENDENT  
TREASURY BOARD” 
 
During the current period of relative calm in U.S. financial markets, and 
before the next financial crisis occurs, Congress should consider passing a 
new Independent Treasury Act that would create a revived Independent 
Treasury System. This system should include an Independent Treasury 
Board and a Sub-Treasury. The Independent Treasury System would be in 
addition to the Federal Reserve System. 
The Independent Treasury Board should report to the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Chairman of FASB and be composed of leading financial, 
accounting, and legal experts. During nonemergency periods, the 
Independent Treasury Board should function like the Valuation Resource 
Group did at FASB and provide advisory opinions on complex valuation 
questions for investors and creditors. In this role, it should primarily report 
to the Chairman of FASB. 
 
 13. Letter from the VRG to Henry M. Paulson, Jr. (Sept. 24, 2008) (on file with author). 
 14. 12 U.S.C. § 5214(f) (“The Financial Stability Oversight Board may appoint a credit review 
committee for the purpose of evaluating the exercise of the purchase authority provided under this chapter 
and the assets acquired through the exercise of such authority, as the Financial Stability Oversight Board 
determines appropriate.”). 
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At any time, the Independent Treasury Board should be able to notify 
the Treasury Secretary of an impending or existing financial crisis (i.e., an 
emergency period). During such emergency periods, the Independent 
Treasury Board should report to the Secretary of the Treasury; the opinions 
it issues on complex valuation questions for investors and creditors should 
be authoritative and set the binding fair value of certain financial instruments 
for all purposes both legal and contractual. 
Under the new Independent Treasury System, a Sub-Treasury should 
also be established and authorized during emergency periods to purchase 
certain financial instruments at fair values that have been previously 
determined by the Independent Treasury Board. In turn, this Sub-Treasury 
should be authorized to sell notes to the public that are guaranteed by these 
acquired financial instruments. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
A liquidity crisis is in many ways a financial manifestation of the 
classical concept of chaos and the more modern concept of uncertainty. 
During emergency periods, it is less important whether the values of certain 
financial instruments are set high or low (so long as they are calculated 
rigorously and impartially), but it is critically important that they be set in an 
authoritative manner. The lack of knowledge about the value of these 
financial instruments during a liquidity crisis and resulting public confusion 
are what create most of the long-term economic destruction and not the short-
term financial losses themselves. Having an Independent Treasury Board in 
place when emergency periods begin should make future transitions from 
crisis back to stability smoother and less problematic for the investing public. 
 
